Randpay is a technology developed in Emercoin for blockchain micropayments that can be more effective in some scenarios than the Lightning Network as we show in the paper. The protocol is based on the concept of Ronald L. Rivest and published in the paper 'Electronic Lottery Tickets as Micropayments' (1997). The "lottery ticket" was designed for centralized systems where a trusted third party is required to provide payments, and in some scenarios is also a lottery facilitator. The existing blockchain protocol cannot accommodate peer-to-peer "lottery" micropayments at least without the need to create payment channels, which is analysed in the paper. Therefore, the implementation required the development of an update to the blockchain core. In the result, RandpayUTXO was introducedinfinitely spendable zero output that requires the payee's signature to be published in the blockchain. Randpay is considered to be the first blockchain protocol to require the payee to sign the transaction by their private key. This is a significant feature to improve not only microtransactions but also extend the use of the blockchain for legal deeds that require a payee's consent to be recognised in legal applications. The second important innovation of this research is the implementation of Blum's 'coin flipping by telephone' problem to design a 'lottery ticket' that does not require any third party to facilitate the lottery. The paper offers an API description, an analysis of the mathematical model, and proof of how 'lottery' can be beneficial. There is also an attack analysis and overview of existing solutions.
I. INTRODUCTION
HE problem of micropayments on the blockchain [1] is that they trigger a number of issues in the scalability of the system: blockchain bloat, bandwidth and growth of fees, issues of trust and security.
The Lightning Network [2] is the most well-known project designed for micropayments. Such projects as SegWit [3] (reduction of data included in the ledger), Ethereum's sharding plan [4] (segmentation of the ledger), and Ardor's two-level (parent-child) blockchains [5] are aimed at addressing some of the scalability aspects, though they do not address the issue of micropayments and should be considered rather as complementary solutions for micropayments than an alternative.
The problem of system load and ledger bloat due to high amount of records produced by micropayments is not an exclusive blockchain issue. It also relates to earlier centralised technologies, where the most common approach to address these issues is an aggregation, which is supported by the following conclusions. Payment aggregation replaces many micropayments with a small number of total payments to be recorded in the ledger. With the aggregation, transactional payments (fees) are paid only for such consummated transactions. In other words, aggregation not only reduces the number of entries but also the transactional costs per payment. There two types of aggregation in centralized systems: 1) accurate, for instance, all phone calls are accounted but paid as a lump sum once a month, and 2) probabilistic. One of the most known probabilistic protocol was proposed by Ronald L. Rivest in 1997 when he published his research on 'Electronic Lottery Tickets as Micropayments' [6] .
There are no known mass implementations of Rivest's method probably because in central-server systems there are other more effective approaches.
The implementation of Rivest's lottery ticket required redesigning the standard blockchain Emercoin protocol as well as the Rivest's protocol itself, because it was designed for three parties: seller, buyer, and bank (broker).
Emercoin was chosen as a development stand and has the following features. Launched in 2014, it is a combination of Bitcoin's PoW and Peercoin's PoS (initially was adopted the original Peercoin PoS, but then the security was improved) currently running with the approximate ratio 1:6 of blocks created by PoW and PoS respectively; hash rate is approximately ¼ of Bitcoin because of the merged mining protocol that allows nodes simultaneous mining of both Bitcoin and Emercoin. Randpay concept was then implemented in the wallet from version 0.7.1 [7] .
The off-chain portion of Randpay was challenged by the requirement to exclude trusted third parties and to provide users to interact with each other peer-to-peer, and at the same time not to use an existing approach for peer-to-peer protocols that require creation of so-called "payment channels" because they typically require also performing opening and closing blockchain transactions (but the aim was to reduce them).
The solution was found based on Blum's 'coin flipping by telephone' problem. In the findings, the Randpay protocol works off-chain and does not require third parties to facilitate the lottery play act, and only payable transactions are directed to the blockchain. At the same time there are no "channels" as found in other protocols; therefore, anyone can pay to anyone and settle the transaction without the need to open the channel, maintain the state of the channel, and close it to pay or to release the funds back.
The core idea of Rivest's 'lottery tickets' is to aggregate microtransactions using a probabilistic method. During the purchase the parties settle the transaction not with the payment but with a 'ticket' which is winning for one of two sides: either the buyer or the merchant. The probability on the side of buyers, who will not pay if they win this 'lottery.' If the merchant wins, the buyer pays and, in our case, only this transaction is recorded to the blockchain ledger.
Presumably the 'lottery ticket microtransactions' are ideal for regular small payments; for example, phone calls with persecond charge. The merchant regulates the price and the probability in a way so to receive payments fewer times but in greater amounts.
Buyers with a higher probability do not pay, but when they do pay, the price is "probability" times higher than if it was a regular payment. Nevertheless, they should not feel like they are being treated unfairly, because they did not pay for services in previous 'plays' and with the same probability will not pay in the future. In the long term, paid and unpaid services tend to equate to a fair balance for both sides, which is proven using probability theory discussed later. Of course, the payment amount in the ticket and the probability all are a matter of bargain; any of the parties is free not to accept an unfavourable deal.
II. MICROPAYMENTS RETROSPECTIVE
In this section we outline the chronology of academic discussion on micropayments which takes place over three decades. As it comes from the analysis, most of the protocols are not relevant for comparison with Randpay because they require third parties and are designed for centralized payment systems. As to found protocols for micropayments in cryptocurrency, they either require payment channels or are not flexible in terms of proba bility variation.
The issue of effectiveness of electronic payments was raised with the appearance of electronic payments themselves. The academic interest to micropayments began in the 90s of the twentieth century with multiple issues on the agenda: the computational power of machines was not enough, the cryptographic schemes were not so developed, and online payments were expansive.
In our analysis we found two different directions of the research in the pre-blockchain period: (1) how to increase bandwidth of electronic payments and so to make possible small payments, and (2) probabilistic methods of aggregation of payments, which were meant to reduce the amount of actual payments, and thus to enable micropayments without the need to significantly increase the performance of the electronic system and the internet.
In the first direction it mentioned the following papers and projects: NetCash (1995) [8] , MPTP (1995) [9] , NetCheque (1995) [9] , Millicent (1995) [10] , Pedersen's payments of small amounts (1996) [11] , NetCard (1996) [12] , PayTree (1996) [13] , iKP Micropayments (1996) [14] , PayWord and Micromint (1997) [15] , Mini-Pay (1997) [16] , Micropayments via coin flipping (1998) [17] , Microcash (2000) [18] , A new Payword Chain (2002) [19] , Micropayments Revisited (2002) [20] , A pay word-based micropayment protocol supporting multiple payments (2003) [21] , NetPay (2004) [22] , A new efficient mobile micropayment scheme (2004) [23] , ecoupons (2005) [24] , Combating Double-Spending Using Cooperative P2P Systems (2007) [25] , A lightweight buyer's trust (2008) [26] , An Improved and Efficient Micro-payment Scheme (2009) [27] , A Mobile Micropayment Protocol Based on Chaos (2009) [28] , Micropayment scheme implementation on the Android platform with performance evaluation (2012) [29] , Anonymous, Secure and Fair Micropayment System to Access Location-Based Services (2012) [30] , Anonymous and Fair Micropayment Scheme with Protection against Coupon Theft (2013) [31] , An Efficient and Secure Micro-payment Transaction Using Shell Cryptography (2013) [32] .
Among the second direction, so called probabilistic methods Taha S. Ali [33] distinguishes probabilistic auditing when payments are done, but only some of them checked on double spending attack in a probabilistic manner, say, 1 in 100 transactions, thus 99 transactions are randomly skipped and the payer never knows whether they will be caught for double spending; and, the second direction -probabilistic redemption, when micropayments themselves are done randomly in some probabilistic manner, therefore, some transactions have not been paid at all, therefore, reducing the system load and transaction fees.
As to papers, the discussion of probabilistic redemption was initiated by Wheeler [34] : "Small cash transactions, electronic or otherwise, can have their overhead costs reduced by Transactions Using Bets (TUB), using probabilistic expectation (betting) as a component."
In 1997 Ronald Rivest proposed the protocol for probabilistic payments, which he called the "lottery ticket." [6] : "The probabilistic nature of lottery tickets makes payment of small values simple. For example, an electronic lottery ticket for a $10.00 prize with a 1/1000 chance of winning has an expected value of one cent. A user can pay a vendor one cent by giving the vendor such a lottery ticket."
The concept of probabilistic auditing was proposed by Jarecki and Odlyzko (1997) [35] . Their protocol was based on probabilistic polling: "During each transaction with some small probability the vendor forwards information about this transaction to the bank. This enables the bank to maintain an accurate approximation of a customer's spending. The frequency of polling messages is related to the monetary value of transactions and the amount of overspending the bank is willing to risk."
Hashem et al. [36] improved in 2006 the concept by their "New probabilistic scheme with Variable Sized Micropayments" which was aimed to reduce the processing workload for the customer as well as the merchant.
During decades of academic work in micropayments appeared a few noticeable overviews, surveys, and evaluations: "The Nuts and Bolts of Micropayments: a Survey" [33] , "Micropayments overview" on W3C web-site [37] , a chapter "Micropayments" in Kou's book on "Payment Technologies for E-Commerce" [38] , "Evaluation of Micropayment Transaction Costs" [39] , "Comparing and Contrasting Micro-payment Models for Content Sharing in P2P Networks" [40] , which can be relevant for a deep study of micropayments.
With the appearance of blockchain technologies due to its limited bandwidth, the issue of microtransactions raised again. Pre-blockchain works are not relevant for further review because they are designed for centralized systems and necessarily require at least one (but sometimes more) trusted third party: a bank, a broker, or in some schemes a "lottery" facilitator.
Pass and Shela t [41] proposed their protocol for cryptocurrency based on Rivest's lottery. Researchers introduced two basic approaches: the first requires changes in the blockchain protocol to enable peer-to-peer lottery ticket between users. The solution differs from Randpa y as it is non-flexible in terms of choice of probability. The authors propose x100 by default. We suppose that any other probability rate to introduce in the protocol requires the upgrade of the system. Therefore, to satisfy the multiple needs of business there must be deployed a wide range of "probabilities" for users' choice. Moreover, the proposed method allows implementation of only even figures because of the binary nature of the scheme. Thus, if the seller needs the probability of x3…x6…x1003…etc., this system does suit them.
The second proposed method and its two variations with escrow and with "invisible" escrow we don't discuss here as it relays on trusted third party, which is not relevant to compare with peer-to-peer (seller-buyer) Randpay.
As to the effectiveness of Pass and Shelat proposition, the protocol requires at least one on-chain payment transaction to lock the future possible payment, and then to play the lottery with this payment and then when the seller wins, they perform the transaction to send this amount to the seller.
Say, the counter-parties "play" the lottery in the token of 0,0001 BTC. The buyer first needs to create this amount by sending this amount from the available balance in the wallet to the escrow address. Then they play and the token will not necessarily be paid with 1:100 probability, i.e. the buyer has 99 chances to get the product for free, and one chance that the seller will get this amount which equals to the cost of 100 products, the seller's winning transaction will be performed on-chain.
The scalability of this scheme is questionable. The first issue here is that the customer needs to have a lot of payable tokens of a specified amount. Moreover, for different services it might be necessary to have a lot of tokens of a different amount, the same as if we had to pay by 25-cent coins for road tolls, and 5-cent coins for calls from public phone booths, we need to have a handful of relevant coins.
The second issue appears from the continuous nature of some services where the client pays while consuming these services and may run out at a certain point. Say, the client makes a call and has to spend 1 Satoshi coin to buy additional time during the session to continue talking. If the client has not prepared enough Satoshis, they will not be able to pay, and the call will be interrupted.
Therefore, clients must prepare beforehand enough payable coin tokens, which may require a relevant number of blockchain transactions, even if they will not be paid after because of the probabilistic nature of such a payment scheme. In case the token becomes payable in the lottery, it requires closing the transaction, which leads to two total transactions per such micropayment.
There is no information on mass adoption of this scheme. As it comes from the paper, the protocol has been prototyped on a testnet.
In [42] Hu and Zhang proposed to improve Pass and Shelat protocol by setting up a time-locked deposit, whose secure utilization is assured by the security of a primitive called accountable assertions under the discrete logarithm assumption, their scheme reduces the number of on-chain transactions to one, and yet maintains the original scheme's advantages. However, authors notice that a s long as both sides of payments are honest, their scheme can be conducted without any third party's involvement and require at most one "on -chain" transaction during each execution.
Among non-probabilistic schemes for cryptocurrency micropayments here to be mentioned: DAM scheme [43] , Micropaying to a Distributed Payee with Instant Confirmation [44] , Orchid [45] , Efficient Micropayment of Cryptocurrency from Blockchains [46] , SLIP [47] and Deploying PayWord on Ethereum [48] . Mentioned papers discuss different aspects of the off-chain payments using payment channels.
The Lightning Network (2016) [49] which recently was launched is an off-chain protocol which can handle micropayments (non-probabilistic method). More detailed discussion on the problem of off-chain payment channels is provided in Section VI: The Lightning Network Comparison.
III. RANDPAY CONCEPT
In this section we explain how Randpay protocol was designed. In the first subsection we discuss the concept of probabilistic payments. The next subsection shows how off-chain part of the protocol provides for peer-to-peer interaction of parties, where they play the lottery. In the beginning we explain what objectives were defined, and which issues were to be addressed by this part of the protocol. It is based on Blum's concept and offers an original solution called "Addrchap" to create a "lottery ticket" which is a space of payment addresses for a choice in the lottery. The last subsection explains how the random choice of the payer becomes an on-chain payment the payee wins the lottery. To support the on-chain part of the protocol the developer created a new technology called Rand-payUTXO -an infinitely spendable dummy output number 0 from a non-existent transaction implanted in the blockchain protocol -which is aimed to prevent malicious behaviour of the payee, who can publish a non-winning ticket in the blockchain and so to permanently lock the payer's money. The proposed solution requires the payee's signature on the transaction which he can provide only if he wins the lottery.
A. Understanding 'lottery tickets as micropayments'
A hypothetical example will be used to demonstrate the concept of Randpay in action. The client, let us call her Alice, is the recipient of goods or services for which she pays cryptocurrency. The merchant, Bob, sells these goods or services for which he expects the payment.
Randpay can be used to sell any items; however, it is best suited for virtual goods and services that cannot be purchased in a traditional way by a direct personal exchange of cash because of the gap at a moment or place of exchange. Simply put, it makes sense for a mass remote distribution of products, which are paid as they are received at a tariff: for example, phone calls with per second charging, road tolls with per mile payments, sharing information (market tickets, news), sharing media, etc.
The essence of the idea is to finalise each settlement not with a payment, but with a 'lottery ticket.' Only Bob's winning 'lottery tickets' will be published into the blockchain as the transaction. Bob provides Alice a "lottery ticket" which carries the information of the space of payment addresses, where one is Bob's winning. Alice makes her random choice picking one address from the provided spaces, generates the raw transaction and sends it directly to Bob. If Alice's choice contains the payment address to which Bob has the private key, he will sign the raw transaction and publish it on the blockchain and so he will take the money. If Alice has chosen a payment address to which Bob does not have a key, this transaction will not be published and just set aside, and Bob will deliver Aliсe the product for free. As obvious from this scheme no opening transaction is required, counter-parties play the lottery off-chain peer-to-peer, and only a payable ticket is published on-chain.
In this case, the mathematical expectation of the transferred amount for each lottery ticket is equal to the amount that must be received in a single payment act.
For instance, the provider Bob receives 2 cents for each call per minute. From 5 communication sessions supplied, Bob will receive 10 cents (2 * 5 = 10). But if he uses a ten-cent 'lottery ticket' with a probability of winning 1 to 5, the expected value of five deals will be the same 10 cents. The mathematical proof of expected linear income is seen in Section V. Economic Analysis and Mathematical Model.
The client plays so-called Russian roulette, where for our example there are 5 sockets in the revolver and only one is charged. When she lands on it, Alice will pay 10 cents (instead of 2). The average rate of five purchases is the same as the initial 2 cents (10/5 = 2). See Fig. 1 .
Fig. 1. Classical payments vs. Randpay
However, such a distribution of risk/benefit may be disadvantageous. Therefore, counter-parties can customise the amount of the ticket and the probability of payment.
In the same example, but with a probability of winning 1 to 100, only every hundredth sale according to the mathematical expectation will be paid. For Bob not to lose compared with classic payments, the ticket price must be 200, i.e. the average tariff for one hundred transactions also tends to become the same 2 cents (200/100 = 2).
Thus, with higher probability and thus, higher frequency Alice gets a completely free session, or with a smaller probability for 1 minute she overpays a lump sum equal to x (probability) times cost of the price per product.
For Bob the value of payments also tends to be a fair amount, which would be obtained with multiple realtime payment acts and what is important not necessarily from the same buyer.
At the same time, the number of actual payments of cryptocurrency also decreases by a factor of 100 (in the last example), and the transaction costs (fees) are proportionally reduced.
B. Оff-chain Part of the Protocol
As already explained, the lottery must occur outside of the blockchain to reduce the system load and ledger bloat, thus only the payable result is to be published in the ledger.
Being peer-to-peer (no third parties), the design of Randpay aimed to exclude at the same time the following known issues of other payment protocols: -It should not require a blockchain initial transaction (escrow, deposit, etc. It should allow adjustable probability for a lottery act play, i.e. parties may wish to specify any probability for any settlement. In Randpay parties play lottery remotely without thirdparty facilitators. Let us discuss the mathematics that supports such peer-to-peer protocol.
Here is the problem. If Alice is to guess the number of Bob's fingers behind his back, Bob can manipulate, showing after Alice's choice any non-winning result. The solution was offered by Blum [50] in his 'coin flipping by telephone' problem.
Here is a schematic description of the Blum's protocol. Alice and Bob want to flip a coin by phone, but they are located at a distance from each other and can only communicate via a communication channel. Bob selects a random sequence of bits b, writes it on a piece of paper, locks this sheet in the drawer, leaves the lock key, and sends the box to Alice. It is assumed that, without having a key, Alice cannot get to the contents of the box. After receiving the box, Alice chooses a random bit c and sends it to Bob. In response, Bob sends Alice the key to the box. The outcome of a coin flip is the d = b ⊕ c. The issue of coin flip is solved with the help of one-way functions.
Randpay protocol is based on Blum's concept and offers an original implementation considering that it was designed for blockchain transactions.
As we know, cryptographic hashing algorithms are oneway functions, thus having a hash sum (also known as 'digest', 'output' and 'checksum') of any input message it is merely impossible to find the message itself [51] .
However, there is another important feature attributed to strong cryptographic algorithms that underlay the found solution. It is barely possible to find logically close outputs, for example, consecutive numbers ('1, 2, 3 ….115'). To find a logical sequence of hashes, the attacker will need extremely high computational power irrelevant to the value of the transaction.
The algorithm of generating of a lottery choice range can be explained in this simplified mathematics. For instance, Bob decided to use number 115. He must divide it by the number of choices in the lottery, let us call it a 'risk'. For instance, 10, literally 10% probability, or 1 out of 10 chances for Alice to guess it.
Then Bob cuts off the decimal, and it must not be disclosed to Alice. Therefore, we have:
(1) 115/10 = 11.5; 11.5 -> 11
Bob sends the number 11 to Alice (let us call it 'CHAP root'), specifying that the probability is 1 of 10 (ten addresses to choose from where one is winning).
Alice multiplies 11 by 10 and gets = 110 which is the base for guessing.
To play this lottery, she adds an arbitrary number of the array 0-9.
Let us say Alice chooses 3 and creates the transaction for Bob with the address retrieved from 113 (110+3). Since Bob's private key is 115, Alice's choice is useless for him; he lost this lottery. Alice does not pay and receives the product for free.
In case Bob lost, he can deny supplying the product, so Alice loses nothing: she neither pays nor receives the product for free.
The mentioned operations in this simplified example are performed indeed with something that is called the "raw address."
The blockchain (crytocurency) address is generated by a set of operations. First, the merchant (in our scenario -Bob) creates an asymmetric pair (public and private key), then from the public key the system generates a digest using SHA-256 , which then becomes an input to retrieve a hash using RIPEMD-160 algorithm. Then the system performs another set of operations which are required to retrieve the blockchain address which is shown to the end user, see [52] for details.
RIPEMD-160 checksum is a 'secret' of the lottery and the initial figure from which the system generates a space of addresses, mentioned in the example as 'CHAP root.' Therefore, the businessman Bob offers Alice to choose to generate one blockchain address to pay from the range of available choices [110, 119] , where only one has a private key, so Bob will be able to dispose of it.
Alice chooses one address from the proposed range and then creates a normal payment transaction on the blockchain to this address but this transaction she sends not to the blockchain but directly to Bob, so he can verify it and publish it himself. Bob will see if the payment amount is correct or not and check if he has a private key to the payment address; if not, then Bob lost this lottery.
As we can see, Blum's solution when applied for blockchain addressees ensures a trustless peer-to-peer environment in the off-chain part of the Randpay protocol. Bob generated choices, and only one for sure is the private key, which allows him to get Alice's money.
"Addrchap" is the lottery ticket with the space of addresses to pay. The buyer makes the choice and packs the raw transaction which sends it directly to the buyer. In the next subsection we discuss how the buyer verifies and signs it to publish on-chain.
C. Naïve 'lottery' microtransactions on the blockchain, or
why RandpayUTXO was developed The typical blockchain protocol, for example, Bitcoin, as well as similar Emercoin, at first glance, have the necessary set of payment scripts to create a resulting lottery transaction.
However, businessman Bob may behave non-cooperatively and publish the transaction, regardless of whether the payer Alice chose Bob's winning address or not.
If Bob publishes the transaction which a non-winning for him, he will not be able to access the money, because neither he nor others have the private key to spend this money in future, as it is explained in the previous subsection. Alice's money would be considered lost forever.
To protect Alice from malicious behaviour of Bob, a proofof-ownership of address 'RandpayUTXO' was developed, purposefully to block a transaction in which Bob does not have the proper key.
A cryptocurrency transaction consists of two main groups of elements: 1) input(s) -that is an address or addresses from which the money are to be spent ("spending"); and
2) output(s) -where at least one address to record the spending, and other address(es) if necessary, to record a change.
The input of a new transaction must necessarily be the output (UTXO) of a transaction recorded somewhere in the previous blocks or mempool. The only exceptions to this rule are transactions that refer to the generic block or cryptocurrency which was just created ("mined").
In the result of development of the Randpay protocol, in outputs, so-called UTXO set, there was planted a special unspendable dummy output number 0 from a non-existent transaction with the following ID:
This special output, called RandpayUTXO, is included in the transaction as input and must be signed by Bob's private key but not Alice's.
The network will not accept a transaction in which at least one spending (input) is not signed by the private key of the address at which it is recorded.
As we know, the original blockchain protocol does not require any action from a recipient, which means a transaction can be sent without the payee's consent or even knowledge of it. However, with RandpayUTXO the transaction needs to be signed by both parties.
RandpayUTXO has the following properties:
• it can be repeatedly endlessly spent, that is, after spending it is not marked as spent; • user can only spend 0 coins, i.e. nothing;
• this UTXO can only be present once in the certain transaction as input, specified as 'randpay-in' here; The randpay-in is to be signed by the private key of the current output (receiving) 'vout[0]' address.
Other words, the output address 'vout[0]' is copied into the input 'vin[0]' during validation and, as result, the 'vin[0]' must be signed by the recipient's private key, associated with 'vout[0],' to be accepted. See a conceptual scheme in Fig. 2 . When Alice has chosen one address from the address space offered by Bob, she creates a draft blockchain transaction, where:
• in the input array she adds the dummy address RandpayUTXO; • in the output 'vout[0]' she puts a chosen address from the lottery. Then Alice signs all inputs except RandpayUTXO and sends it off-chain (directly) to Bob. Bob signs dummy input if Alice has chosen the address to which he has the key and sends the transaction to the blockchain. That is, how Bob's winning transaction becomes blockchained, but in the case of a loss, it will be dropped off.
As we see in the result of the improvement of the blockchain, this is the first ever implemented protocol that technically requires a recipient's private key.
It should be noted, however, that this invention has another significance beyond the protocol for microtransactions. There are some types of legal transactions where the recipient's consent is required, because otherwise it does not acquire legal force. For example, in some jurisdictions, in a deed of gift, the recipient must accept the gift. It also can be applied to transactions that require consent from authorities which are not at the same time beneficiaries. For example, the sale of a land plot may require consent from the government. In this case, at least two addresses will be specified as output: the one which receives an asset and the other which gives the consent using RandpayUTXO but receives nothing or a part of the payment (for example, as a fee "duty stamp").
Therefore, RandpayUTXO can be applied not only for micropayments but also for other payments to ensure payee's consent. Emercoin RandpayUTXO introduced the technology which makes blockchain transactions closer to the real world with a variety of legal constructions which users may require.
IV. ATTACK ANALYSIS
The lottery protocol and its Randpay implementation are designed to prevent malicious behaviour and do not require any third party for settlement, i.e. peer-to-peer. In the result of a lottery, the client Alice can lose and therefore pay a lump sum, which is larger "probability" times than if it was a classical purchase. Bob's strategy here is to supply the product not before but after the 'lottery' action. Therefore, in the worst scenario, Alice does not pay the lump sum but does not get the product -nobody loses.
There is, of course, the possibility that Bob will receive money but will not supply the product. But this is a general problem attributed to both conventional payments and Randpay and stands beyond the purpose of this research. Alice's strategy to minimize her risks here as a client is not to agree to a deal with an unacceptably high payment or use an escrow (third party).
In the previous section we explained "addrchap" and "RandpayUTXO" which excludes attacks on the protocol from Bob. Let us consider attacks from the side of the client Alice to the Randpay system and measures to prevent them.
Attacks on the Randpay subsystem can be divided into two groups: incorrect formation of transactions aimed to pay less or not pay at all, or an attack on the blockchain consensus by cancelling a transaction through 'double spend', which in our scenario is to spend the same input before the finalisation of the 'lottery' act (hereinafter 'double spend' is referred to as 'DS').
To perform the attack analysis we researched all elements of the system, thus, the description of API and URI protocol is provided in Appendix I and II.
Briefly, the protocol consists of 'WANTPAY' which is Alice's request to Bob where she specifies the amount of payment and probability. This step is not obligatory; presumably it is for bargaining. The second step is obligatory 'NEED-PAY' where Bob sends the request (or response to the previous step) to Alice where he sends the lottery ticket 'addrchap' (space of addresses to pay), payment amount, and probability. The third step: Alice makes her random choice from 'addrchap' and sends it to Bob. Bob's wallet verifies Alice's message and sends it to the blockchain if Bob has the private key to the chosen address.
A. Attacks on the Transaction
The attack scenarios discussed in this subsection are impossible in Randpay, since the current code contains mechanisms to prevent them. However, the analysis is given as a theoretical discourse to explain the architecture of the protocol.
1. Probability manipulation. Alice attempts to create a transaction with a lower risk trying to extend the space of provided addresses for the choice, so she increases her probability to choose a non-payable ticket:
─ Will result in the wrong unpacking of the address space "addrchap." Bob will detect it within the current protocol (See Appendix I "API").
─ There is virtually no chance of sending the unpacked addrchap to the similar one that belongs to another person.
For this case there is an extremely low probability that Alice will randomly pick the address where coincidentally Bob has a private key, so Bob will get the money, which is not bad at all.
2. Smaller amount. Alice attempts to send a smaller amount than required. Bob will detect this attack through the analysis of the amount when he receives a draft transaction within the current protocol (See Appendix I "API").
3. Alice pays with the spent or non-existing coins. An attempt to use unreal or already spent coins will be checked the same as described in the previous case.
4. An attempt to reuse a signature from earlier used vin[0] in other lotteries. The attack is useless, as it is also detected when Bob verifies "randpay_submittx," as described in the two cases earlier. Moreover, if Alice creates a naïve transaction (does not use RandpayUTXO), Bob can publish it; therefore, permanently burning Alice's own money.
B. Attacks on the Network
This kind of attacks is possible but has adequate preventive countermeasures.
1. Alice creates two raw double spendings (DS). The first is a Randpay payment which she sends to Bob and immediately the second spending of the same money to herself or someone else which she sends to the mempool.
As a result, we have a logical race. If the Randpay transaction is winning for Bob, he can sign and send it. But if someone has already found a new block with the second transaction which Alice has sent to mempool; the network will not accept Bob's transaction, because of the nature of the blockchain protocol which does not allow DS.
It is remarkable that Bob will see himself the second Alice's transaction is accepted in the ledger, therefore, detecting her malicious behaviour. So, he will not deliver his services.
Even if Randpay is not winning for Bob, he will see Alice's second spending in the ledger. Moreover, he can also detect it when it is pending in the mempool.
The earlier Alice creates DS, the higher the chances of a successful attack but the higher probability that Bob detects it during the verification.
For the record, there is no way for users to call back their transactions from the mempool.
Bob's tactic here to reduce the risk is to create a random period of time of delay. For example, it can be around 1-10 seconds in order to check the existence of DS transaction. In case it appears in the cue of submitted transactions (in the 'mempool'), Bob will avoid sending the product irrespectively.
We should notice here that the delay period must be specified based on empirical data of the certain system and business logic. The few-second delay in delivery can be unacceptable for some business schemes, which makes Randpay protocol unusable. To add, if a delay period is applied this information should not be disclosed, otherwise, the attacker will try to double spend after the delay. Also, a good practice here will be if the delay is randomly changed for each transaction within the certain range, it will not be easy for the attacker to detect it empirically.
As we see, this vulnerability cannot be excluded at all, but Bob can manage his risks by adjusting the pending period to detect the fraud attempt and also can decrease the payment amount. Therefore, the loss will not be dramatic for his business, since the attack itself can happen with a certain probability, therefore cannot be systematic.
2. Alice creates DS but sends it only at the moment when she sees Bob's winning transaction in the mempool. In other words, Alice attempts to attack when she sees that Bob wins her money, and so she tries to get it back.
In this case, Alice does not have many methods to get it back; she sees the copy of her own transaction already signed and sent in the mempool across the blockchain network, in any moment a new block will be created.
Keep in mind that Emercoin does provide for priorities for transactions depending on their fees, all fees (unclaimed output) are burned, miners and minters get their reward only for block creation; therefore, it is impossible to use a higher fee to increase the priority of a specific DS transaction.
In order to decrease the probability of such an attack, Bob can use the command 'connect' to communicate only with reliable nodes in order to avoid direct sending of Randpay transactions to a fraudulent person. Later, when Alice receives Randpay through the blockchain, the lower the chance to win the race. Here, Bob uses the same strategy as described above. He imposes a delay in the provision of the product to Alice in case he wins.
Furthermore, the level of Bob's risk can be limited for new customers to avoid setting a high amount on the prize.
As we see this attack is possible with a certain probability and the advice here to Bob is to manage the risks using similar methods in the previous scenario.
3. The client Alice is a POS minter. Alice may find a kernel transaction that solves the block and adds a block with DS. However, the block with DS is not sent to the network but used to make a Randpay purchase.
After receiving the product, she publishes the block to the network, thus taking the money back because DS will be confirmed once, while Randpay will not be confirmed at all.
While Alice holds the block privately, there is a chance that someone else will solve it, and Alice will lose her minter's reward for the block. So, there are two additional options, which are relatively similar to the situa tion described above: a) Alice always publishes the held block, thus informing Bob that she is a cheater even if afterwards it appears that she would win her money back (with a higher probability); or b) Alice publishes the block only if Bob's winning transaction is already on the network, thus removing it from mempool.
In both cases, the minter Alice has the risk of not getting the reward as a result of the delay.
The average risk is around 1% of the total reward per 6 seconds of delay because the average lag between blocks is 10 minutes. And this affects each block, and not just the winning one.
As a result, the amount of losses must be multiplied by the risk rate:
(5)
loss = risk * block_reward * time_delay / 600s
Let us take a real-world example of the risk analysis. The block award for minint in the block #364069 was 18.388 EMC [53] . For instance, the lottery ticket amount ("risk") is the same 18.388 EMC, if Alice waits at least 60 seconds her theoretical loss is 18,388*18.388*60/600 = 33.8118544 (EMC). It is important to notice that 600 seconds is only an average figure. In this example, our block was found only 3 minutes 41 seconds after the previous. Therefore, as you see the accurate assumption for an attack success is not feasible.
To add, Alice needs a lot of coins that have been held at least one month because minting starts after being inactive one month, and the chances increase until the end of the third month and then remain the same; furthermore, such an attack is not always possible because of the random nature of Proofof-stake consensus [54] . In other words, it is not a real option for systematic cybercrimes.
C. Recommendations for Bob
1. As in the case with the regular transactions, Bob needs to wait for a couple of new blocks, at least one. By doing so, Bob protects himself from various problems.
2. For real-time sales when Bob does not wait for published blocks he should:
─ create a list of existing clients (or at least a list of known IP addresses), not allowing new clients to use higher probability rates; ─ use a random delay in the delivery of the product for new clients; ─ track DS using a different wallet that is not related to his main one; ─ remove unnecessary connections from the main wallet and keep connections only with reliable nodes; ─ if the product per unit is not high-priced, Bob needs to be ready to lose a part of it, like shops lose a part of their assortment as a result of pilfering.
V. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND MATHEMATICAL MODEL
The economic model of Randpay as any other protocol for probabilistic payments is different from the traditional one. First, it works better for products of a small value which are supplied in a large amount that can be paid by micropayments. A tariff for phone calls per second is a relevant example here.
For the current state of the art of the blockchain, micropayments are an issue. They lead to blockchain bloat and create an undesirable load on the network having a limited bandwidth.
If we take the telecommunications industry as an example and imagine that each phone call ends with a settlement, it is easy to calculate that with a transaction size of 200 bytes (usually more), 2 trillion world telecom calls per year [55] will require an annual increase in blockchain size by 400 Terabytes, which is unacceptable.
One can argue that there are mechanisms for reducing the size of transactions, for instance, Segwit, which reduces the size almost by half. But even 200 Terabytes per year instead of 400 is still an insurmountable barrier for the practical use of cryptocurrency in telecom (if you pay for each call) and in other areas of application that require mass payments.
If Randpay transactions are applied in telecom with the probability 1/10000 (only one transaction per each 10,000 is paid) the settlement of the world telecom for 2 trillion calls a year will add only 40 Gigabytes to the blockch ain, which, although a lot, is acceptable for practical use and can be additionally shortcut by Segwit and transaction optimiser [56] that will make this figure even smaller.
Using Randpay, clients do not pay small payments for lowvalue products. There is a small chance that they will lose this lottery and will have to pay the larger amount for the product, but when they regularly consume the product, they on average will pay the same as if they had to pay in the traditional scheme, which is further proved based on the binomial distribution.
The merchant on the other side, by providing a large number of small value products from time to time, receives large payments at a certain level of probability (which we earlier called this variable "risk"). These occasional winnings cover a large amount of previous losses. Of course, the merchant needs to carefully manage their risks to conduct business in this way.
The use and the implementation of this protocol may be confusing. The user may question: "Why must I pay by "lottery ticket" more than I buy (even if a lump sum payment is still small)? Why must I pay the ticket at all when it turns out to be not for me? Why do I not just drop it and refuse to the take the product, and try my luck to get it for free another time?" Some consumers may find this payment method inconvenient or unacceptable, therefore, should find another deal on the market. But when the client Alice agrees and enters into the deal, she must pay even if Bob wins the ticket, because these are the terms and conditions which she agrees on. This is similar to low-cost flights. The tickets are cheap, but if you decide to cancel your trip, you cannot get a refund. That was the deal you agreed on in the very beginning.
For such payment instruments to work, a user-friendly interface is highly required to make payments smooth. The user experience should be reduced to a simple one-click "Pay" button, which generates a sequence of commands and scripts including random choice of the payment address on the lottery ticket.
Since the acquaintancу with a probabilistic payment model raises a lot of questions here, we propose a mathematical model of its use and influence on the blockchain ledger.
Understanding the economic model of Randpay will help to overcome some of the psychological barriers discussed above.
Below is a simplified statistical model for the set of Randpay transactions based on the average input values. This simplification is correct since transactions in Randpay are mutually independent, and their order does not impact the statistical parameters of the model; that is, it allows arbitrary grouping by any parameters.
The mathematical expectation of profit in the Randpay model is based on binomial distribution, the concept which is developed within the probability theory and statistics [57] .
Randpay is subject to binomial distribution where formula (6) is applied:
E is an expectation of the sum from n payments; n is the number of payments; p is the probability.
For the proposed model, this formula can be specified as (7):
where tx amo is the actual amount of payments received by the seller.
The risk here is the initial parameter that the buyer and seller mutually agree on when concluding the contract (8):
At the same time, the probability is calculated using formula (9):
The probability of non-winning is calculated respectively using formula (10):
Therefore, the binomial distribution for a large number of transactions is approximated by the Gaussian normal distribution [58] (11):
np is a mathematical expectation; npq is a variance.
From variance we take a standard deviation (12):
Therefore, now we can calculate the deviation from the expected amounts. For example, the standard expected amount from n payments is 1000, but after n payments with this current risk, the seller receives the actual amount, which is less, more, or equal to the expectation, shown in formula (13):
We can calculate a relative error using formula (14) :
With a lot of Randpay actions, the relative error is solved with formula (15):
→∞ √ = 0
As we can see from this equation, the relative error for the expected profits tends to be zero. This means in large numbers of transactions the seller can get what they expect from the business. The seller's transaction amount is calculated by the formula (16):
The average fee for transactions tends to decrease when the risk factor increases. This is seen in formula (17):
As it was emphasised that Randpay has a beneficial effect on the standard growth of the blockchain due to normal micropayments, there is a formula (18):
Finally, let us make some conclusions of scalability of Randpay within the network. The initial equation shows that the number of actual transactions that can be inserted in the block is equal to or less than the limit of the block (19) :
L is the limit of the block size.
When using Randpay, the transaction amount is not equal to all raw transactions (lottery tickets or deals). They become transactions with a certain amount of probability, which in our case is a 'risk' of the seller (20):
where ′ is the number of generated raw transactions sent from the buyer to the seller.
Thus, the analysis of the amount of all raw transactions with the current level of the risk looks like (21):
′ ≤ Eventually, we can analyse the number of raw transactions and their influence on the network (22):
The conclusion here is that for any number of deals, i.e. the total amount of raw transactions, we can fit blockchain bandwidth limits only with the increase of the 'risk ' parameter.
VI. THE LIGHTNING NETWORK COMPARISON
There is no obvious answer as to which micropayments are better. Randpay and the Lightning Network [49] have conceptually different approaches with pros and cons.
In the Lightning Network (LN), the payment aggregation system is a separate network of agents connected by payment off-chain channels. In the LN "channel" Alice or Bob, or both in case they have mutual payments, can make an initial blockchain transaction to lock some cryptocurrency as a deposit for their further off-chain interaction. As we mentioned in Section II "Micropayments overview" there is a variety of off-chain payments protocols based on cryptography that have been proposed.
In the LN, two agents use a channel by linking their cryptocurrency in a 'channel opening transaction'; they only offset each other by not sending the transaction to the network, and eventually close the channel by sending a 'channel closing transaction' to the blockchain. Thus, only two transactions (opening and closing) are reaching the blockchain. Settlement occurs directly between the agents and is not affected by the blockchain network. The scheme can accommodate interaction of more than two parties. If Alice and Bob have their payment channel, as well as Bob and Charley, Alice and Charley can make payments through Bob. Bob becomes their payment provider.
Such a system has the following advantages and disadvantages.
Advantages:
• High transaction speed -no need to wait for confirmations from the blockchain.
• Absolute accuracy of payment -the recipient in each act of payment receives the exact amount.
Disadvantages:
• Requires the creation of processing infrastructure -a network of operators of channels that are always online.
• The channel operators may want to receive payment for their money transfer services within their channels, such as VISA or MasterCard payment systems do.
• Payments are possible only within the network of channels -it is impossible to send a payment to any address, as is happening now in cryptocurrencies.
• In case of failure of the channel operator or deliberate denial of service, payment becomes impossible.
• When creating a channel, it is necessary to lock some amount of coins in it, and in case of non -cooperative behaviour of the counterparty or denial of service, this amount may be blocked for a long time.
• Denial of service is possible due to the exhaustion of money in the channel. For example, during mass sales.
• Protocol with status. That is, the user needs to create a channel, and store its last state somewhere, and they can forget about it only after closing. In the case of loss of fortune by both counterparties, the money collected in the channel may become lost forever. Some of these risks are explained by the LN authors [2] and other discussions can be found online among enthusiast [59] [60] [61] .
Thus, the Lightning Network is similar in purpose and structure to a payment processing system such as VISA or MasterCard in the sense it links holders of crypto wallets.
Consider the advantages and disadvantages of the Randpay system compared to the Lightning Network:
• A network of channel operators is not required. To work with Randpay, one need only have an Emercoin wallet and nothing more.
• Hence, there are no fee payments to such network operators.
• Hence, there are no elements of unreliability associated with the functioning of such operators.
• 'Any to any' transactions are naturally possible, and it shares the generic idea of a cryptocurrency.
• The actual (average) payment amount in each act can be below the minimum cryptocurrency unit (Satoshi).
• Funds are not restrained in channels for a long period. It usually becomes clear in seconds whether the ticket won or not, and the payer can reuse the money of one non -winning ticket in any other payment.
• There is no denial of service problem due to channel exhaustion.
• Compared with two opening and closing transactions in the Lightning Network, Randpay sends one transaction to the blockchain, which makes the system twice as efficient with the same aggregation factor.
• Randpay is a stateless protocol. That is, it is not necessary to establish a channel or other financial relations with the counterparty, remember the condition of the channel, and close it correctly. Therefore, there is no risk of the channel being lost.
• The special completion of the payment protocol is also not required, which is especially useful with unreliable communication lines. Any counterparty can disconnect at any time without harm to payments.
• For a reliable payment, one needs to wait for the confirmation of the transaction by closing the blocks, as in regular cryptocurrency payments. Work without confirmations is possible but requires additional measures to protect against fraud.
• The actual amount of payment will differ from the 'fair' price, but in the long run it will tend to it as we saw in formula (15) .
A brief comparison Table 1 can be presented as follows. 
CONCLUSIONS
As a result of our research, we came to the conclusion that Randpay is a sustainable technology for micropayments.
The model is based on the buyer's desire to gain the product for free and acceptance of the possibility of having to pay a higher price from time to time, but which tends to become a fair price during regular use for both parties.
The seller is a supplier of low-priced products. In traditional business, it typically leads to high transactional costs (either in cash payments or cryptocurrency). The model offers the seller a certain level of probability to receive a lump sum from time to time instead of micropayments. The seller decides for themselves the level of probability (risk). Of course, all of this makes sense for large numbers of transactions, which increases the chances for lump sums. Over a long time span, the proper risk/probability averages profit to the level of the traditional model of business. Onetime customers are also possible because the profit is calculated through all transactions of all customers of the product.
In addition, the seller can choose a strategy of selling simultaneously using both models: Randpay and traditional subscription model, which gives a competitive advantage in the market before those buyers that, for some reason, may want to use Randpay. For example, some people are gamblers, or because of a typical consumer's desire to get free stuff.
The implementation of this protocol required the research work despite the fact that it is based on some known concepts like Rivest's 'lottery ticket' and Blum's 'flipping coins by telephone'. In the findings of the research, two o riginal solutions were found: 'addrchap' which is based on Blum's tool for creating a provable and fair peer-to-peer remote off-chain lottery ticket where the choice is offered a space of payment addresses with only one payable, and RandpayUTXO which is an unspendable zero output as an addition to the blockchain protocol that requires the payee's signature on the payer's transactions to prevent locking the funds on a dead-end address.
In the results, we also came to the conclusions that RandpayUTXO has a side effect beyond the microtransactions protocol because it can be used for regular transactions for which the law requires an explicit consent of the recipient in order to be recognised as valid.
Randpay has a beneficial effect on the network. While the capacity of the blockchain protocol remains the same, the network in general can provide for better performance in terms of the number of transactions that users can conduct in their business because only a part of these will go to the network. Randpay also helps to speed up payments. Randpay here helps to overcome the inherent average time of blockchain transaction acceptance by offering parties to conduct most of their transactions on the blockchain instantly (or at a very high speed) which is comparable to the average of 10 minutes. The use of such a tool reduces the average fee per transaction which, along with other conveniences, in general reduces transactional costs in a broad sense. 
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Appendix I
API is implemented as an extension of the JSON HTTP Emercoin API and provides for the generation and processing of Randpay transactions by a node/wallet. Using this API, the user's program (for example, Bob's selling platform) interacts with the node and makes or receives payments. In the case of a correct operation of the API functions, the node returns values indicated in the specification below. In the case of incorrect data input, malicious behaviour, or error run, a 1 Please consider this as a pseudo programing code for a short illustration in this paper. Consult the Emercoin core code on the page of the project: standard error code is returned with an accompanying text message.
A. Steps
Randpay payout protocol (Emercoin kernel from version 0.7.1 [62]) consists of the following steps 1 :
This step is optional, yet desirable for bargaining. By sending this request, Alice informs Bob that she is interested in a Randpay payment of a certain amount with the probability to pay (p = 1/risk). In other words, the real averaged amount of the onetime payment is amount/risk.
For example, in case of WANTPAY(100, 100000), Alice informs that she wants to pay 100 EMC with the risk rate of 1/100000, i.e. the real averaged amount of the payment is 0.001 EMC.
The example can be the following: Alice buys the package 1 second of phone calls for 0 EMC or 100 EMC, where 100 EMC is what she pays with the probability of 1/100,000 (= 0.00001). With the regular purchases according to the binomial distribution she pays 100/100,000 = 0.001 EMC per second (see Section 5).
NEEDPAY(double amount, uint32_t risk, char [] addrchap)
Normally, Bob's NEEDPAY request is sent as an answer to Alice's WANTPAY in the previous step; however, NEEDPAY is obligatory.
The businessman Bob informs client Alice that he would like to receive payment of a certain amount for his services with the probability of 'p = 1/risk', thus offering the client the chance to guess an address from the space of the addresses (risk, addrchap).
Parameters (amount, risk) sent to the client can be different from those indicated in WANTPAY request. This is made in order to allow Bob to refuse risky offers.
PAYMENT(uint32_t risk, char[] rawtx)
Client Alice sends a Randpay transaction to Bob's server in accordance with the parameters set in NEEDPAY.
First, Bob checks the amount on his own, if the chosen amount by Alice's payment/risk satisfies him, he then sends it to the wallet for verification using the blockchain protocol. In case there's no sign of malicious behaviour (see the next subsection for details of attacks scenarios), Bob can provide the services to Alice.
If Bob wins, the wallet will sign the transaction automatically and publish it in the blockchain of Emercoin.
B. API elements
API consist of the following elements:
https://github.com/emercoin/emercoin.
• randpay_createaddrchap (uint32_t risk, int timeout)
Bob creates a pair of private and public keys for the given probability rate and generates the base (the raw) of the space of addresses 'addrchap' from the public key:
The 'addrchap' result (160 bits in HEX) is used for NEEDPAY step (see below) and makes no changes in the blockchain. However, the wallet keeps the generated values in the memory for the further use in a pair 'addrchap -> Privkey'. 'Int timeout' is the parameter of the period during which the user wants to cache this data.
• randpay_createtx (double amount, char[] addrchap, uint32_t risk, int timeout, bool naive=false)
Payer Alice creates the raw (draft) transaction with the 'amount' and a selected address during which she must: a) unpack 'addrchap' from hex into the binary form b) create an address 'rand_addr' from the pair (risk, addrchap) (4) uint160 rand_addr = risk * addrchap + GetRand(risk) c) create a Randpay transaction to rand_addr; it is obligatory to put the payment into vout[0] and use vin[0] to indicate RandpayUTXO d) put the used inputs 'on hold' not to accidentally spend them in other payments while Randpay is not finalised (around 30-60 seconds) e) signs all the available inputs (except RandpayUTXO) f) choose parameter 'naïve' if the payment does not require RandpayUTXO, as otherwise randpay-in must be added and the spending declared to the vin[0]
System returns: randpay_tx_hex // HEX raw transaction; Alice sends 'randpay_tx_hex' to Bob.
• randpay_submittx(char[] Randpay_tx_hex, uint32_t risk)
Bob's wallet verifies here the code of the draft transaction using the previously cached pair 'addrchap -> Privkey'. When Bob wins, he signs a transaction and sends it to the network. Bob's wallet steps: (a) Check signatures for inputs for the given raw_tx_hex, except for randpay-in 'vin[0]'. If a signature is missing or if the input 'vin[0]' is signed, then check it also. If at least one of the inputs is not available, not signed, or incorrectly signed, it returns error 'err=-1' (double spending attempt). Correct and winning transactions are passed on to step (b), otherwise they progress to step (c).
(b) Sign RandpayUTXO vin[0] with the privkey, associated to vout[0] and send the transaction to the blockchain (winning case).
(c) If Alice does not guess the address, then Bob is unable to sign RandpayUTXO, and this transaction (non-winning case) is just dropped.
System returns:
• amount -the sum from vout[0];
• won -Boolean indication of a winning ticket.
C. Randpay URI
In addition to the API interface discussed above, Emercoin wallet contains a mechanism for sending Randpay payments by calling it via a URI by an external application (for example, a browser), similar to the Bitcoin BIP21 mechanism [63] , which Emercoin also supports. This mechanism allows internet sites, through the user's browser, to request micropayments in Emercoin, forming a corresponding URI on the page. The user clicks the link, and the user's wallet after confirmation immediately pays the site through the Randpay mechanism.
This interface can be used by sites to sell access to articles or media content (video, music, etc.).
For example, a site may request 0.001 EMC for accessing an article by creating a Randpay request with the parameters amount = 10 and risk = 10000. An example of a URI for such a request is the following: emercoin:randpay?amount=10.0&chap=00dead beef&risk=10,000&submit=http%3A%2F%2Fran dpay.news.com%3Fid=777%26article=666
Let us explore more the Randpay URI structure. Its general appearance is:
emercoin:[//]randpay?amount=DOUBLE&chap= chap_hex&risk=INT[&timeout=INT]&submit=C ALLBACK_URI
Here in square brackets are elements of the URI, which the site may not specify. The URI parameters of this interface (amount, chap, risk, timeout) correspond to those in the randpay_createtx () call.
• amount -the amount of the payment transaction which Alice will pay if Bob wins the lottery. • chap -the requirement of a lottery ticket in the hex representation, formed by the recipient (website). • risk -the reciprocal of the probability of winning.
• timeout -the time interval in seconds for which the UTXO outputs that are involved in the transaction are blocked. The parameter 'submit' contains a 'callback-URI'. There, the user's wallet will send the generated Randpay transaction (lottery ticket) in HEX code using HTTP POST. The special characters contained in this parameter reserved in rfc3986 standard [64] , for example, '/: &', must be recoded into a 'percentage representation', to avoid a conflict between the parameters of the original URI and the callback-URI.
The user of the wallet can specify the parameters controlling the behaviour of this interface in the emercoin.conf file (after the '=' sign, the default parameters are shown):
• rp_max_amount = 0 -the maximum amount in a transaction that can be sent without confirmation, EMC. • rp_max_payment = 0 -the maximum amount of payment that can be sent without confirmation, EMC. • rp_timeout = 30 -blocking time of inputs used in a Randpay transaction, sec. • rp_submit = false -automatic selection of the 'Submit' button in the payment confirmation window. The default choice is CANCEL, that is, cancellation of payment.
